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Liberty and the Normative Force of the Law in Montesquieu's The Spirit
of the Laws
Cory Wimberly
Abstract
The aim of this essay is explore what demands living in liberty places on citizens in Montesquieu's The
Spirit of the Laws. In contrast to the ideas of liberty from many of the thinkers that were to follow him,
Montesquieu's notion of liberty requires that citizens subject themselves to the regulative relationships
required by his normative conception of the law. For Montesquieu, living in liberty is not just a situation
in which one avoids what the law forbids and is otherwise left 'free' without interference and coercion.
For Montesquieu, liberty is a positively elaborated ideal with normative demands and a set of''necessary
relations" that citizens must form. The result is that a life ofliberty is defined in a significant way by the
laws that bind a citizen because liberty is not the freedom to construct different ways of life, but the
freedom to live securely within a particular way oflife. I highlight this overlooked feature of The Spirit of
the Laws by mobilizing Aron, Althusser and Durkheim's work on the law in Montesquieu to draw out the
implications ofMontesquieu's notion oflaw for liberty.

We must face up to the implications ofthis theoretical revolution. It
presupposes that it is possible to apply a Newtonian category oflaw
to matters of politics and history. (Althusser, L. Politics and
History, 34)

Part of the joy and frustration in dealing with Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws lies in that it
is work of tremendous innovation. It is exciting to deal with a host of new ideas being sorted out
by a thinker who was committed to their originality and struggled with the vocabulary and
structure to give them voice. Besides the excitement there is also the frustration that many have
felt when Montesquieu's ideas lacked the clarity that would allow them to make complete sense
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of them. Although an older commentary, Levin's Political Doctrine of Montesquieu's perhaps
gives the most direct voice to the puzzlement and exasperation that boils up in many secondary
sources, "An essential preliminary task in presenting the political doctrine of the Esprit is to
disentangle it from the chaotic mass of good things gone astray in which it is embedded" (Levin
1936, 1).

In another example, Rahe remarks that Montesquieu's definition of liberty is

"puzzling" (2009, 33), while Richter calls it "notoriously ill-phrased" (1977, 95). Amidst this
general agreement that parts of the text are somewhat opaque, it can be hard to draw a definitive
line between what is unclear in The Spirit of the Laws (henceforth Esprit) and what is just
insufficiently understood. Certainly, the line passes back and forth as interpretive arguments
progress, pushing us to see that an assumption of ambiguity or vagueness in the text is really just
an oversight by the readers, or that points that had been assumed to be clear are really more
opaque than one might have believed.
My aim here is to move new elements in the relationship between law and liberty from the
'Puzzling' column to the 'Clear' column. I provide new perspective on the relationship between
law and liberty through approaching Montesquieu's idea of liberty from an odd angle. Many of
those who have explored Montesquieu's doctrine of liberty are approaching Montesquieu from a
liberal point of view; one of the best examples of this is Pangle's Montesquieu's Philosophy of
Liberalism. Pangle ascribes Montesquieu a forerunner's spot in the history of liberalism and
certainly one cannot deny that Montesquieu had a tremendous influence on the history of liberal
thought. However, we should also be attentive that Esprit predates the category of 'liberalism';
Larrere points out that the term 'liberal' did not appear until 1750, while Esprit was published in
1748 (Larrere 2009, 280). I do not raise this issue to undermine or invalidate the previous work
on Montesquieu and liberty by liberals, in fact this essay builds off that work, but I raise this
issue to point out that Montesquieu did not see himself as working within a liberal orthodoxy and
we should not expect all of his work to conform to the basic tenets of liberalism. This essay
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extends Montesquieu's work on liberty in ways that would be unexpected if we were to
understand him as a liberal, so I raise the issue of Montesquieu's relationship to liberalism in
order that we might leave open space for him to deviate from the positions that one might expect
from a liberal.
Instead of approaching Montesquieu's notion of liberty from a liberal point of view, I approach it
with an interpretation highly influenced by the French Marxists and sociologists Durkheim, Aron
and Althusser. These authors investigate Montesquieu with a different focus than many other
commentators on Montesquieu do. As thinkers working in the tradition of Marxist theory, the
notions of individual freedom that Montesquieu put forward were not of primary interest to
them, but as sociologists, they were quite interested in his work on the scientific laws that govern
human life and society. These sociologists focus on his notion of the law, which allows him to
reveal ''the nature and arrangement of the elements composing [societies]" (Durkheim 1960, 13).
By approaching Montesquieu's notion of liberty through the French sociologists' work on law,
we can come to see new facets and implications of Montesquieu's work on liberty that derive
from his normative and relational view of the law. Durkheim, Althusser and Aron all stress the
normative quality of law for Montesquieu and emphasize that the law is not just something that
forbids particular actions but prescribes a particular nature or norm to them:
Most of the rules he sets forth are truths-stated in another
language-which science had already proven by its own
methods. He is concerned, not with instituting a new political
order, but with defining political norms (Durkheim 1960, 17).
My contention is that the implications of Montesquieu's adoption of a normative conception of
the law on his idea of liberty have not been fully explored, especially in terms of the
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requirements it places on the individual. The aim of this essay is explore to what demands living
in a free nation places on citizens in Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws when the full
ramifications of a normative form of the law are taken into account. In contrast to many of later
liberal thinkers, Montesquieu's notion of liberty requires that the citizen subject themselves to
the regulative relationships required by his normative conception of the law. Living in liberty
therefore is not just a situation in which one avoids what the law forbids and is otherwise left to
construct a life without interference and coercion. For Montesquieu, liberty in each nation is a
positively elaborated ideal with normative demands and a set of "necessary relations" that
citizens must form. The result is that a life of liberty is defined in a significant way by the laws
that bind a citizen because liberty is not the freedom to construct different ways of life, but the
freedom to live securely within the norms that govern a particular way of life.
My concern with Montesquieu's notion of liberty is not just antiquarian, it also derives from an
effort to grapple with the notion of liberty in our own time. Many thinkers have commented on
the contemporary prevalence of normative institutions and laws, including Foucaultians,
feminists, race theorists, critical theorists and others:
With this new economy of power, the carceral system, which is
[discipline's] basic instrument, permitted the emergence of a
new form of'law': a mixture of legality and nature, prescription
and constitution, the norm. [...] The judges of normality are
present everywhere. We are the society of the teacher-judge, the
doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the 'social worker'-judge; it is
on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and
each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his
body, his gestures, his behavior, his aptitudes, his achievements
(Foucault 1995, 304).
It has been a topic of recent interest to consider how freedom can be conceptualized and
practiced in a society that operates on extensive networks of normative forms of power. Authors
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such as McWhorter (2009), May (1994) and Winnubst (2006) have attempted to work through a
notion of freedom commensurate with the exercise of normative power. Montesquieu offers us
the advantage of an account of liberty informed by different historical concerns than our own.
His difference from the present is the benefit he offers us in terms ofthe possible tools to escape
the confines ofthe conceptual universe that binds our thought and to begin thinking in new ways
that might dislodge some ofthe problems that confront us. Although this essay will not have the
space to deal with this contemporary literature on normalizing power and liberty, my hope is
more historical work like this will enable new thinking on the subject.
This essay will proceed in four parts. First, I use Aron, Durkheim and Althusser to flesh out the
'proto-sociological' approach Montesquieu took to politics and the impact it had on his idea of
the law. I explore why, if we are to accept the sociologists' interpretation of the law in
Montesquieu, we need to expand, but not necessarily refute or reject, much of the current
thinking about his doctrine of liberty. Next, I flesh out the implications of a normative
understanding of the law for Montesquieu's notion of liberty. Finally, I conclude by reviewing
current literature on Montesquieu's ideas ofliberty in light ofthe contributions ofthis essay.
Part I: The Law
This section deals primarily with Montesquieu's account of the law in a way that is deeply
influenced by the French sociological tradition. This is not to say that many of these same ideas
on the normative role of the law cannot be found in other interpreters but that it is typically
neither emphasized nor explored as deeply it is in the French thinkers, who make it a central
concern. My aim here is to develop a notion of how the law operates in Montesquieu so that we
are in a better position to evaluate the full extent of the meaning of liberty as ''the right to do
everything the laws permit." (Montesquieu 2006, XI.3).
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Law is often used in two quite different ways in theoretical discourse. In a negative or juridical
usage, law typically exercises a forbidding function in the sense of outlawing a certain action. In
this case, 'law' serves only to express a relationship of limitation in which, out of all possible
actions, an individual is forbidden from carrying out the action forbidden by the law. For
instance, a law might prohibit jaywalking or robbery but it would leave all of the other possible
actions a person might undertake equally open for the individual to choose between. This is not
the notion of the law Montesquieu had in mind and one can miss important aspects of his idea of
liberty by approaching his understanding of law as a jurist might (Richter 1977, 67).
In a second usage, law denotes a positive or normative relationship between two or more
things-this notion of law is generally associated with the sciences. Montesquieu writes, "Laws,
taken in their broadest meaning, are the necessary relations deriving from the nature of things;
and in this sense, all beings have their laws: the divinity has its laws, the material world has its
laws, then intelligences superior to man have their laws, the beasts have their laws, man has his
laws" (Montesquieu 1989, 1.1). Law in this case does not describe so much what is forbidden as
much as it describes exactly what something must do, how it must necessarily relate to the world
around it. The planets follow the path of their regular orbit, just as water must boil when it is
sufficiently heated, and human beings are of the nature to seek out each other's company; all of
these parts of nature follow the "necessary relations" that "derive from the nature of things."
Montesquieu again emphasizes that the law describes the norms within which relationships
between things unfold in their positivity in the following quote: "laws are both the relations that
exist between it and the different beings, and the relations of these various beings to each other"
(Montesquieu 1989, 1.1). In comparison with a juridical usage of the law that bans one action but
leaves all the others free, the normative usage of the law prescribes the way an object must act
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and makes the other options impossible. Althusser highlights this normative usage of the law as
revolutionary in the history of politics and history:
We must face up to the implications of this theoretical
revolution. It presupposes that it is possible to apply a
Newtonian category of law to matters of politics and history. It
presupposes that it is possible to draw from human institutions
themselves the wherewithal to think their diversity in a
uniformity and their changes in a constancy: the law of
diversification and the law of their development (Althusser
2007, 34).
In Esprit, the law works like a kind of regularizing joint or hinge that defines how one thing can
articulate itself in reference to another. Laws describe the web of relationships that, taken as a
whole, define the persistent and positively articulated character of possibility, the "necessary
relations" that define our world.
Key here is to realize that Montesquieu sees the law prescribing for human beings a set of norms
according to which they relate to the rest of being. Just as a scientist might describe the path a
cannonball would follow if it came in contact with a certain force, Montesquieu wants to be able
to describe the normative path that human society would follow given certain influences:
Many things govern men: climate, religion, laws, the maxims of
the government, examples of past things, mores, and manners; a
general spirit is formed as a result.
To the extent that, in each nation, one of these causes acts more
forcefully, the others yield to it. Nature and climate almost
alone dominate savages; manners govern the Chinese; laws
tyrannize Japan; in former times mores set the tone in
Lacedaemonia; in Rome it was set by the maxims of
government and the ancient mores (2006, XlX.4).
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Montesquieu is careful to note that the influences on human beings are many, so that a scientific
study of the laws that shape human behavior has to be complex and take into account many
different causes and their interactions with one another. Nonetheless, the project to reveal the
nature of the relationships that govern human beings is possible, even if exceedingly difficult.
Montesquieu calls the host of all the regulative forces that govern a nation the general spirit. The
general spirit is not one influence among many but the aggregate total of all of the many lawful
forces acting on a group:
The general spirit, then, is not a partial cause comparable to the
others, but a product of that totality of physical, social and
moral causes. [ ...] The general spirit is not a ruling, all
powerful cause which would do away with all of the others. It
is, rather, that quality which a given collectivity acquires over a
period of time as a result of the variety of influences upon it
(Aron 1968, 45).

The general spirit is like the resultant force vector that an object follows when it is acted upon by
multiple forces; many forces may act upon an object to push it in different directions but,
ultimately, the object can only follow one path, which is the result of the many different forces
pushing upon it. It is the human scientist's job to work with this general spirit and come to
understand the component parts that resulted in its final direction, to understand the "necessary
relations" that together create the general spirit.
Aron, Durkheim and Althusser are all keen to emphasize that in Montesquieu human life and
human societies follow normative laws because this notion of the law makes the human sciences
possible. If human beings operate in relationships that follow certain normal or regular paths,
then one can work to discover the norms and their causes that define any particular society. For
instance, if one were to study a variety of human cultures in hot climates and notice that they are
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prone to despotism as Montesquieu does, then one might hypothesize that the heat is related to
the despotism:
The heat ofthe climate can be so excessive that the body there
will be absolutely without strength [ ...] most chastisements
there will be less difficult to bear than the action of the soul,
and servitude will be less intolerable than the strength of spirit
necessary to guide one's own conduct (Montesquieu 2006,
XIV.2)
In this quote, Montesquieu traces the lassitude and lack of self-governance in hot climates to the
action of the heat on the body. It is because that heat has a regular or normal range of effects on
the body that he feels confident in voicing his results. However, if the law just worked negatively
to forbid certain actions then one could not constitute a science because, outside of what was
forbidden, what was actually done would be arbitrary and without rule:
Ifwe assume, however, that there is no such causal relationship
and that the effects can be produced without a cause or by any
cause whatsoever, everything becomes arbitrary and fortuitous.
But the arbitrary does not admit of interpretation. Hence, a
choice must be made: either social phenomenon are
incompatible with science or they are governed by the same
laws as the rest ofthe universe (Durkheim 1960, 10).
Here Durkheim argues that it is imperative to notice that Montesquieu's notion of the law is
normative and prescriptive, otherwise we lose what makes his study unique as a first attempt at
forming a human science.
What has been discussed so far is law in the most general sense. We need to transition now from
an exploration of an undistinguished and general notion of the law to an elaboration of
Montesquieu's notion of positive law because it is positive law that is of most value in sorting
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out liberty. As we will see, when Montesquieu speaks of the law in relation to liberty, he is
referring to positive law (2006, XL 3).
A section from Montesquieu in the opening book is helpful for beginning to understand positive
law in its specificity from other types of law:
These rules are a consistently established relation. Between one
moving body and another moving body, it is in accord with
relations of mass and velocity that all motions are received,
increased, diminished, or lost; every diversity is uniformity,
every change is consistency.
Particular intelligent beings can have the laws that they have
made, but they also have some that they have not made (2006,
1.1).
Human beings have many laws that they are subject to that they have not made and have no
ability to alter-every child who tries to fly by jumping off of the garage is reminded of just how
little effect their will has on some laws-but human beings also make some of their own laws
and have the ability to create, modify and destroy them; positive laws fall into the latter category.
In the above quote, Montesquieu gives voice to a dissymmetry in law in terms of its origins
human beings create some laws, like positive law, while they inherit other kinds of laws-while
also establishing a symmetry in that they both create the necessary and binding relationships
between things that makes every diversity a "uniformity" and every change a "consistency."
As a result of the normative character of created laws, these "made" laws have an interesting
reflexive property. The reflexive property of human created laws are due to the way that they are
established as a result of the way other laws govern human beings and they also come
themselves to establish a governing relationship, acting back on the general spirit that formed
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them. In other words, the laws that people make are expressions of the general spirit that then
come to compose and alter that general spirit.
We must be careful, as positive law is not the only law that people create that in turn acts back
on them to regulate their future behavior. We must distinguish positive laws from these other
forces. Here, Montesquieu distinguishes positive law from manners and mores:
Mores and manners are usages that laws have not established,
or that they have not been able, or have not wanted, to establish.
The difference between laws and mores is that, while laws
regulate the actions of the citizen, mores regulate the actions of
the man. The difference between mores and manners is that the
first are more concerned with internal, and the latter external,
conduct (Montesquieu 2006, XIX.16).
Laws, mores and manners are all three human made laws that create binding norms for human
relationships. Positive law forms a subset of these human created laws that is unique in that
establishes the relations that regulate people in their guise as citizens; in other words, the positive
laws regulate people insofar as they are subjects of a particular public or state apparatus. Positive
law carries the weight of establishing the necessary relations between the individual, other
citizens and the state. When positive law works well it establishes relations that build the unity
of the citizenry and the state:

We have just seen that the laws of education should have a
relation to the principle of each government. It is the same for
the laws the legislator gives to society as a whole. This relation
between the laws and the principle tightens all the springs of the
government, and the principle in turn receives a new force from
the laws. Thus, physical motion and action is always followed
by a reaction (Montesquieu 2006, V.1).
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Here Montesquieu is concerned to point out that legislation will alter the relationships between
the citizenry and the state and care must be taken in crafting the law so that it strengthens that
relationship and ''tightens all the springs of government." If the positive laws are in harmony
with the principle of the government, then it will work to reinforce the government by
strengthening or creating relations with the citizenry that reinforces its guiding principle.
Likewise, we can invert his proposition to conclude that a law that is created according to a
principle counter to that of the current government will require relationships to be established
that will undermine the government, weaken it and deplete its forces.
It is precisely because the laws establish a host of necessary relations that legislators have to be
wise in crafting them; a positive law impacts, to a greater or lesser degree, the relations that exist
between things within the nation. When one creates a positive law, one puts in place a set of
norms that will interact with all of the other forces acting on human society and the legislator
must take care that the effect is positive. Put otherwise, the spirit of the laws interacts with and
modifies the general spirit and so those that craft positive laws need to be careful to create laws
that will have the proper effects on the general spirit:
Laws should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are
made that it is very unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit
another. Laws must relate to the nature and the principle of the
government that is established or that one wants to establish,
whether those laws form it as do political laws, or maintain it,
as do civil laws.
They should be related to the physical aspect of the country; to
the climate, be it freezing torrid, or temperate; to the properties
of the terrain, its location and extent; to the way of life of the
peoples, be they plowmen, hunters, or herdsmen; they should
relate to the degree of liberty that the constitution can sustain, to
the religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, their wealth,
their number, their commerce, their mores and their manners;
finally, the laws are related to one another, to their origin, to the
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purpose of the legislator, and to the order of things on which
they are established. They must be considered from all these
points of view.
This is what I undertake to do in this work. I shall examine all
these relations; together they form what is called THE SPIRIT
OF THE LAWS (Montesquieu 2006, 1.3).
This quote from Montesquieu reveals that positive laws are a normative force on human beings
but that positive law is not the only normative force. Positive law comes into being in a situation
in which there are always already other normative influences. The climate, the terrain, wealth
and other factors exhibit a regulative and shaping influence on human beings; "a wise legislator"
would recognize these other normative factors and seek to create positive law that interacts with
them in the desired way to produce a beneficial result (Montesquieu 2006, VI.13). A positive
law created in one country may not have the same effect as the same law in another country with
different forces at play; for instance, Montesquieu remarks that a Roman law forbidding "men to
keep more than sixty sesterces in their houses" was a great success in Rome while in France a
similar law ''was catastrophic" (2006, XXIX.6).
Montesquieu's analysis of the effects of positive law is not a simple one; he does not just confine
his study of the relations established by a law to those to the explicitly named in a legislative
text. Montesquieu recognizes that laws have effects beyond their intended consequences and
beyond what the text may explicitly state: for example, positive laws set precedents for other
laws and alter the course of future legislation; they interact with other positive laws to have a
combinatory effect that is beyond what either of the them would have had alone; a positive law
may have a symbolic effect that inflames or pacifies a nation; laws may encourage shifts in
manners, mores and/or religion that will impact the stability of the government, etc. When
Montesquieu considers positive law he does not restrict his analysis of its effects to those
immediately created in the letter of the law, but he looks at it the law as establishing a set of
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relationships, only some of which might be named in the body of the law. As a result,
Montesquieu argues that he is not so much worried about whether a law belongs in particular
category or another but with the spirit of the law, the total effect it has in terms of establishing
regulative relationships within the nation:
I have made no attempt to separate political from civil laws, for,
as I do not treat laws but the spirit of the laws, and as this spirit
consists in the various relations that laws may have with various
things, I have had to follow the natural order of laws less than
that of these relations and of these things (2006, 1.3).
Here we learn that Montesquieu is not interested in chasing after the ideal stated by the law as
much as what it establishes in practice-a set of relations that is likely much larger than what the
text is likely to reflect. Here the spirit of the law is similar to the general spirit, both are terms are
meant to capture to the totality of the effective regulative laws established. Montesquieu wants to
capture the "spirit of the laws" in terms of the entirety of effects a law has on society.
What we need to take away from our discussion of law to our next section on liberty is that
positive laws do not just forbid certain actions; positive laws exert a normative power over
citizens to compel them to establish particular relationships with the world around them.
Although an unwise legislator may not recognize the way that their law will work to necessitate
new relationships and modify existing ones, their laws will nonetheless have those effects.
Positive law creates an obligation on the part of the law-abiding citizen that extends far beyond
just avoiding what the law forbids; following the law means entering into relationships that
require one to articulate oneself in a particular way in regards to any number of possible objects:
other citizens, one's wealth, marriage, property, etc. Positive law creates relationships that exert
a regulative and normative impact on the citizen's life that will alter its necessary character and,
considered in aggregate, the character of the nation.
49
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Part II: Liberty and the Law
In this section, we will revisit Montesquieu's ideas of liberty-which are based in part on his
notion of the law-making sure to keep at the forefront of our analysis the normative qualities of
the law. Liberty has two primary facets for Montesquieu, liberty in relation to the constitution
and liberty in relation to the citizen; we will have to look at both facets in order to flesh out the
full implications of his notion of law for liberty. Liberty in relation to the constitution details
how the government must be arranged in order to permit liberty, while political liberty discusses
how this liberty will appear in relation to the individual citizen.
Liberty in relation to the constitution is described in four lines:
It is true that in democracies the people seem to do what they
want, but political liberty in no way consists in doing what one
wants. In a state, that is, in a society where there are laws,
liberty can consist only in having the power to do what one
should want to do and in no way being constrained to do what
one should not want to do.
One must put oneself in mind of what independence is and what
liberty is. Liberty is the right to do everything that the laws
permit; and if one citizen could do what they forbid, he would
no longer have liberty because the others would likewise have
this same power (Montesquieu 2006, XI.3).

The first line of each paragraph reminds us that liberty is not a freedom to do whatever one
wants; in other words, liberty is not independence. Independence bears a complicated
relationship to liberty. While independence might seem to be the freest form of existence, in
practice it is not. Although when one is independent one is not limited from undertaking any
particular actions by positive law, one's independence disrupts the rule of law and opens one up
to exploitation and coercion by others who may also decide not to follow the law:
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For Montesquieu, the purpose or nature of government in
general is the creation of security, or freedom, for its citizens
freedom from domination and from threat of death or attack by
other men. The purpose of government is to use the power of
the state to suppress the natural war among individuals (Pangle
1973, 49).

In this sense, it is the law that creates a zone of liberty because the law is not so much a limit to
freedom as what makes it possible through creating security. Without the law, one would not be
free from the unjust and coercive interference of others and hence, one would have to live in a
relationship of fear with the world. The law is not truly a limit on freedom but it is what makes
untroubled liberty possible, "Life under the law is the only life which is secure and therefore
free" (Pangle 1973, 110). At the same time, independence is not free because it implies a
freedom from the law that would put one at risk of harm from others.
The second sentences in both paragraphs on constitutional liberty speak to the relationship of
liberty to the law and are of central interest to us. We should keep in mind what was just said in
regards to the law: Montesquieu does not understand law in the sense a jurist might, what ''the
laws permit" is not just the sum total of things that are not forbidden. What ''the laws permit" in
different political situations is positive and normatively defined; it comprises a list not just of
what one should not do but the relationships that must be maintained. This becomes even clearer
if we look to the first formulation of liberty in the quote, ''the power to do what one should want
to do." 'What one should want to do' highlights the normative character of the law in relation to
space for action protected by liberty. After all, Montesquieu does not say that liberty is not doing
what the law says one should not do; liberty is undertaking the positive action that one should
want to do.
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What should one want to do? We must recognize that for Montesquieu the law is not only
normative but it is also variable from society to society. For Montesquieu, the spirit of the laws
and the relations that they demand are different when different governing relations are present.
Different climates, terrains, ways of life, religions, numbers of inhabitants, commerce, mores and
manners all are part of the variable general spirit that determine what type of political regime is
developed. Depending on the mix of forces that makes up the general spirit, one can end up with
a number of different political regimes: a republic, monarchy, despotism or a hybrid of them.
The importance of this to liberty is that what "one should want to do" will be different depending
on which type of regime one lives in. For instance, Montesquieu argues that in a monarchy one
must live for "honor," while in a despotism one must live in "fear," while in democracy one must
live in ''virtue" (Montesquieu 1989, 111.6; IIl.9; 111.3). The citizenry of different types of regimes
need to be differently constituted and maintain a different spirit for the regimes to be successful.
A monarchy is unlikely to be successful, for instance, if the people in it behave as if they were in
a democracy. So, although liberty consists in "having the power to do what one should want to
do," what this means in practice will differ as the character of the laws differ in their normative
impact:
Given the type of state, the system of laws must follow.
Montesquieu follows the causal sequence still further. Not
content to show that the laws depend upon the form of the
society, he seeks out the causes upon which the form of society
itself depends and, among these causes, the one that plays the
major role, that is, the volume of the society (Durkheim 1960,
37).

Unlike the American Bill ofRights, liberty for Montesquieu does not consist in any cross-cultural
or transnational set of rights or protected list of activities; what one should do, and hence what is
protected, will differ depending on the regime. Liberty is life within the set of required relations
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that is determined according to the nature and principle of the regime that the individual lives
under.
In relation to the constitution, liberty will be made manifest in a nation if the structure of a
government compels its officials and the people ruled by it to act within the norms required by
the law; in other words, liberty will reign if the constitution can compel people to do what they
ought to do. To do this, the constitution must establish a governmental structure that encourages
adherence to the particular normative qualities that make that society what it is. For instance,
Montesquieu writes that a democracy must be motivated by a "love ofequality" (2006, V.3). The
love of equality is the desire to neither be lesser nor greater than others in the republic, whether
in terms of wealth, power, or otherwise. For the reason of equality, Montesquieu argues that a
democracy is most naturally formed and maintained when the lands are divided as equally as
possible and the people have a desire for frugality and so do not desire to become wealthier than
one another (2006, V.6). It is the role of the constitution of a democracy to make sure that the
basis for society remains hospitable for democracy because "inequality will enter at the point not
protected by the laws, and the republic will be lost" (2006, V.5). Without the material, social
and economic basis for a democratic society remaining intact, the society would be subject to
upheaval and social transformation-all of which threatens security and stability and opens the
individual to lawless actions by others. Through our emphasis on the normative quality of the
law, we can see that making sure that people do what "'they should want to do" involves
maintaining an extensive set of social norms. A free nation must have the ability to maintain its
normative standards by compelling its citizens to act according to the relationships defmed by
the law, otherwise the society will falter, the rule oflaw will fail and people will be subject to the
coercion and violence ofothers.
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Before we move on to liberty in relation to the citizen, we need to complicate this notion of
liberty in relation to the constitution yet further. For, although the constitution must preserve the
normative basis ofsociety, in other words, keeping people doing what they ought to do, there are
many forms of government that cannot achieve this task. There is a functional contradiction in
trying to get most ofthe forms ofgovernment to embody liberty. Most obviously, despotism is a
political system constructed around the whims ofan all-powerful leader who rules based on fear.
Such a government cannot be held to a constitution as the despot cannot be reliably held to it;
despotism ''has no rule" oflaw but only the rule by a despot who "is strong only because he can
take life away" (Montesquieu 2006, 11.8). Such a society has no stable law, no stable order and
little in the way of security for its citizens. So, although constitutional liberty is at one level
compatible with all sorts ofvaried political regimes in that its aim is to maintain the rule oflaw,
in practice there are not many types ofregimes in which power is distributed in such a way that
all ofthe members ofthe government can reliably be held responsible to the law.
The failure ofliberty in certain types ofregimes is interesting for what it says about the inability
of those regimes to maintain their own normative basis. In nations whose form is inherently
hostile to liberty---despotism especially but also democracy and aristocracy-the norms that
compose the state are constantly being undermined and transformed (Montesquieu 2006, XI.3).
Such unstable regimes constantly cause their own downfall because they cannot maintain the
rule of law, they cannot maintain adherence to the necessary relationships that define their
particular form of government. In their inability to maintain the rule of law, where law reflects
not just certain forbidden actions but also the spirit that makes the regime what it is, these nations
destroy their own basis. In the case ofdemocracy, the heavy handed and abusive pursuit ofvirtue
can undo liberty: "Who would think it! Even virtue has need of limits" (Montesquieu 2006,
XI.4). The over-aggressive pursuit of the virtue of each citizen can put the moral police in a
powerful position that they can use to undermine the power of their fellow citizens and set
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themselves above them. One can imagine how impossible it would be to maintain an equal and
democratic balance of power if those with whom one was disagreeing with had the power to, say,
burn one at the stake for heresy. Likewise, a lack of moral authority in a democracy can cause
the degeneration of the virtue necessary to a democracy and "When that virtue ceases, ambition
enters those hearts that can admit it, and avarice enters them all" (Montesquieu 2006, 111.3). A
democracy is predisposed to become an aristocracy or despotism either by giving someone the
too great power to monitor and enforce virtue or it is prone to the birth of ambition through a lax
enforcement of virtue. Either way, democracy is prone to undermine the very norms that sustain
it-just as the other immoderate regimes are as well. As a result, a democracy is not a nation that
can exist in liberty as it tends to promote its citizens doing what they should not want to do,
"Democracy and aristocracy are not free states by their nature" (Montesquieu 2006, Xl.4).
Montesquieu's analysis of the English constitution makes sense in this light as it is a constitution
that has "political liberty for its direct purpose" by insuring that everyone follows the law (2006,
XI.5). The English split their government into three branches, the executive, legislative, and the
judicial, in order that each of the three parts might exercise a check on each other's power to act
outside of the law. The English constitution is an exemplary execution of liberty: it provides a
series of powers that force each other to act according to the law.
The English constitution works to uphold liberty not just by preventing certain individuals from
doing what is forbidden, it also directs them to act in consonance with the general spirit of the
nation:
The form of these three powers should be rest or inaction. But
as they are constrained to move by the necessary motion of
things, they will be forced to move in concert (Montesquieu
2006, XI, 6).
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In this quote, Montesquieu describes the way that government works in the terms of physics:
government must be made to follow the "necessary motion of things", to have a certain kind of
motion that follows a prescribed path. In the case of the English constitution, it requires all three
powers to act in "concert," to act in harmony with the general spirit. Any power that sought to
act to increase its share of the power would be opposed by the other two powers thus insuring
that all of the parts of government act within their sphere and according to its prescribed
function. Liberty in the constitution exists when the government is constructed in such a way that
people do what they ought to do, which is not just to avoid breaking the law, but adhering to the
normative spirit of the laws.
The second aspect of liberty, political liberty, "consists in security or, at least, in the opinion one
has of one's security" (Montesquieu 1989, 11.2). If liberty is taken care of at the level of the
constitution by insuring that the government must follow the law through a system of checks and
balances, then the citizen's security should not be threatened by the abuse of power by
government officials. However, security may still be threatened by private citizens who seek to
manipulate the power of the government with false accusations: ''this security is never more
attacked than by public or private accusations. Therefore, the citizen's liberty depends
principally on the goodness of the criminal laws" (XIl.2). Proper enforcement is important for
the obvious reason that if one is falsely accused while one is doing what one should, then one's
ability to do what one should, i.e. one's liberty, is roundly under attack.
Montesquieu's concern for security goes beyond moderating government power and preventing
false accusations; his concern for security extends to the much broader field of the general
maintenance of social norms. Montesquieu tasks it to the police to maintain order and security: "I
restrict crimes against tranquility to the things that are a simple breach of police; the ones that,
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while disturbing tranquility, attack security at the same time" (Xll.4). To understand this last
quote and its implications for liberty, we must understand that the police in France during the
17th and 18th centuries are not the same police of today. Foucault, in his recently published
lecture course Security, Territory, Population, spends a significant portion considering the role
of the police in the 17th and 18th century, especially in France. He most generally defines the role
of police as "the set of means by which the state's forces can be increased while preserving the
state in good order" (2007, 313). Already this should indicate to us that the police are not
primarily about upholding negative state power in the form of interdictions; the police aim to
create a general situation in which the state's forces are maximized and kept in good order, i.e.
they maintain the general spirit. The tactics used by the police centered on regulation, the
transformation of a situation to meet certain normative goals:
We are in a world of indefinite regulation, of permanent,
continually renewed, and increasingly detailed regulation, but
always regulation, always in that kind of form that, if not
judicial, is nevertheless juridical: the form of the law, or at least
of law as it functions in a mobile, permanent, and detailed way
in the regulation (Foucault 2007, 340).

A "breach of the police" is a breach of the good order, the specific order of improvements that
the police are constantly seeking to deploy and then improve upon. Montesquieu's discourse on
law in the section on liberty should be striking indication to his reader that liberty is not a place
where one can do whatever one wants as long as it is not forbidden. Liberty is a situation in
which one is secure in doing what one should and that security is provided by a whole series of
forces that seek to maintain the spirit of the laws and the general spirit.
It is at this point the emphasis on the operation of laws in a normative fashion begins most
obviously to produce new insight into Montesquieu's idea of liberty. Liberty for Montesquieu is
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not a liberal non-interference or independence, it is the ability to freely act out one's life as long
as one constrains oneself to act according to the norms that the laws spell out. Liberty does not
consist in an infinite number of possibilities to become whatever one would like to be; liberty
consists in a certain number of ways of living a life in concert with the spirit of the laws. Living
in liberty is doing what one "should want to do," which is defined following the "necessary
relations" that stem from the laws. If people act outside of the law and establish relations with
things, fellow citizens, or between the government and the governed that strike against the norms
established by the law, then liberty is threatened in its relationship to the constitution and the
individual citizen. If one is setting up illicit relationships then one is undermining the spirit on
which the government rests by developing connections that follow another spirit.
As a result of Montesquieu's examination of the normative laws that sustain particular types of
societies, he defines security as the maintenance of those norms through government moderation
and the policing of those norms. Security could not be maintained through just preventing illegal
actions-for instance, the fact that most people are not robbed does not imply that people are
acting according to the principle and nature of the nation-security is only maintained when the
unique spirit of the nation holds strong and constrains the relationships that people form to work
within the spirit of the laws. Due to the specificity with which governments define norms via the
law, living in liberty may be quite difficult, constraining, and involve constant work to embody
successful conduct as defined by the law. For Montesquieu, liberty involves the whole of society,
from the government, to commerce, to individuals in their manners and mores acting in
consonance with the normative relations that make the collectivity what it is. As we noticed,
certain political forms are not able to sustain their own spirit and so they fall to revolution and
change of that nature and so those regimes cannot maintain the security that liberty consists in.
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Liberty in Montesquieu may seem off to those of us that grew up in the liberal nations of the
west. Liberty is certainly not defined by maximizing non-interference by the government or
one's neighbors; liberty is the freedom to live in a secure, stable regime in which one can count
on the law being followed and, hence, the spirit of the nation continuing on. This liberty is a
liberty of peace, regularity and constancy. The type of liberty that Montesquieu favors does not
work by making the maximal allowable room for difference and pluralism within the nation, for
one to constitute oneself, one's life and one's family however one would like without
interference from one's neighbor. Of course, certain differences of social class, occupation, etc.
are necessary for a society to maintain its spirit-I am not arguing that Montesquieu puts in place
a framework that encourages perfect homogeneity-but that the different social actors allowable
within a nation are defined by its spirit which restricts the number and types of different social
roles (Larrere 2009, 292-3). Where Montesquieu is most tolerant of difference and perhaps most
seeks to protect it is in the plurality of norms that compose the different nations and necessitate
different laws:
Different countries have different objectives. This is why
political good is plural: there are as many political goods as
their situations in place or time. This leads Montesquieu to
reject the idea of a unique good, applicable to all places and
times alike (Larrere 2009, 289).

This pluralism is difference preserved across nations, which means little in terms of the
opportunities to an individual to construct different ways of life unless the individual has
opportunities to emigrate to those nations. Montesquieu finds liberty reigns when the law and the
norms it necessitates are followed. That in itself is freedom: the freedom to live one's life with
the constancy, regularity and known expectations of enduring social norms.
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Part III: Implications for Current Work on Liberty:
What this interpretation of liberty adds to the literature is a more detailed sense of the normative
burden liberty places on the citizen in Montesquieu. Exploring Montesquieu's understanding of
liberty in concert with the French sociologists' emphasis of the normative role of the law reveals
the extensive restrictions that liberty places on one's possibilities to construct different forms of
conduct by limiting one to live in compliance with the law. As I have understood law through
the French sociological tradition, liberty is a normative framework that specifies a range of
positively elaborated conduct and, as a result, acting within the law means much more than just
avoiding what the law forbids. To some extent, this issue appears to be off of the radar of many
of Montesquieu's commentators. Raher, for instance, does not consider it all: he is certainly
detailed on the restrictions and duties of the government in a free state but he does not detail how
the people must constitute themselves as citizens to maintain liberty (Rahe, 2009). Pangle very
briefly considers the issue in a paragraph of his book, Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism,
but when he does it seems to me that he relies more on a later liberal notions than on a close
reading of Esprit:
Montesquieu identifies liberty with a life lived under the rule of
law. A man is free only when he limits his doing as he wishes to
activities not forbidden by law (Pangle 1973, 109-110).
This notion of liberty as the freedom to do whatever the law does not forbid might be found in
Locke or Mill, but I do not think this is the idea we find in Montesquieu. Ultimately, I think
Pangle might agree with me, as the little work he does on this subject is in significant tension
with the more elaborate comments he makes later. At the end of the same chapter in which he is
considering the importance of England in the Esprit, he ends by emphasizing that England is
only able to maintain its liberty because its citizenry establishes the distinctive normative
relationships that make liberty possible:
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Montesquieu did not wish to simply mirror English society. He
rather looked to what he believed to be the most portentous
characteristics of England, the qualities and the spirit which he
hoped and believed would shape the future of the world. The
English constitution and its way of life is to be the guide, the
polestar in political affairs (Pangle 1973, 160).

In contradiction to his earlier lines, here Pangle emphasizes that liberty is possible in England
only because the citizenry have adopted a particular ''way of life" that reflects a certain "spirit."
Although the rest of the world would not be able to adopt tout court the English spirit and way of
life, they could still serve as a normative "polestar" from which others might begin to craft their
own regulative ideals. Pangle's insight here is spot-on in my estimation and it speaks to the
argument I have made in this paper in terms of the relationship between the law and liberty; here
he emphasizes that liberty requires adherence to certain norms guiding the way of life of the
citizenry.
Although the issue of how the law constrains individuals to constitute themselves as free subjects
has not generally been a focus in the interpretation of Esprit, we can see that Pangle is not alone
in attributing a later liberal notion to Montesquieu:
Rather than assume the existence of a governmental prerogative
to regulate human conduct in all areas not fenced off from
interference by explicit legal protections, he preferred to adopt
the view that citizens may only be compelled to do what the law
obliges. Beyond that, they are by definition free (Carrithers
2001, 24).

Although Carrithers and Pangle generally have excellent readings of Montesquieu's notion of
liberty, I think a reflection on what obedience to the law requires does not let one interpret the
burden of liberty on the citizen to be just avoiding what the law forbids. The law in Montesquieu
does not just specify a few actions that one must not follow and leave all of the rest as equally
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valid choices. The law prescribes the "necessary relations" that pertain between individuals and
their world and so it places a much higher normative demand on the conduct of the individual. In
regards to liberty, this means that doing what "one should want to do" and protecting the security
of the citizen under the laws involves following a positively defined spirit.
In a larger context, the Esprit brings into relief the difficulty adjudicating between a collectivity
that only is what it is because it adheres to certain norms and the freedoms promised by liberty
that may well undermine those norms. Certainly, there are many people today in war tom and
uncertain nations who would find it a great freedom to be able to wake up the next day and find
out that the world is much the same as they left it when they went to bed. For them,
Montesquieu's focus on favoring the stability of the nation would have top priority. Freedom
would make sense as security and lawfulness. However, many people may find the stability of
their nations to be precisely what disturbs them in that the nation constrains them to a way of life
they find demeaning, oppressive, and hostile. For these latter people, liberty may indicate the
ability to challenge, change or disregard social norms in the creation of one's own way of life
this is not a notion of liberty Montesquieu embraces. Montesquieu's place in this debate is clear:
he offers us a notion of liberty as security. In the Esprit, liberty is not to be found in the ability of
individuals to act without interference and to conduct themselves with only the minimal
constraint of avoiding what is illegal. Liberty is to be found in the security that comes with a
protected, stable and enduring way of life in which the law remains constant and life is in many
ways predictable.
Although Montesquieu's notion of liberty may go against the grain of much of the common
wisdom of liberal political practice today, I think it is a notion that we are much closer to than it
might first appear. We are societies that give great credence to the social sciences. We seek
answers for our issues in sexuality, family life, workplace dynamics, etc. from the social
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sciences. These social sciences direct us to the environmental and genetic causes of our behavior
so that we can understand, if not change, who we are. If human life and conduct reflect their
lawful and regular responses to the forces around them, then it may well be that a more
libertarian notion of freedom premised on the minimization of interference from others does not
earn us much. After all, if we are constrained to act according to the laws that bind us, then
giving a wide berth for the individual to conduct themselves outside of those norms is just to
fight human nature. Our belief in the power of the social sciences to determine the causes of our
behavior brings us closer than we might think to Montesquieu who apparently did not find much
use in a definition of liberty premised on a freedom to create many different ways of life. If
human life follows rules, then what else should freedom be besides the ability to follow those
rules in security?
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